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1.1 Motivation and main results
Conicts among human beings seem to be an unavoidable reality of everyday social life. Situa-
tions characterized by conict usually stir up emotions in conicting parties. On the one hand,
a party may feel positive emotions, such as pride, when enjoying success despite bleak prospects
in the quarrel. On the other hand, a party may experience negative emotions like frustration,
for instance, when failing to succeed despite excellent prospects. It can be expected that parties
take into account these emotional consequences of a conict ex ante. Emotions aect whether
they will enter into situations bearing potential for disagreement, and also their behavior in
the conict itself (see evidence from experimental studies presented by, e.g., Bosman and van
Winden 2002, 2010, and Hopfensitz and Reuben 2009). Litigation represents such a conict
scenario where parties involved argue in favor of their position and may experience emotional
costs or benets.
In this paper, we introduce the notion of emotions into the type of litigation contest which
allows for dierent levels of defendant fault (Hirshleifer and Osborne 2001). Litigants' emotions
are naturally dependent on whether the litigant wins or loses, and the facts of the case at hand.
For instance, the plainti will experience strong negative emotions if a case is lost that was, in
evidence-terms, very strongly biased in her favor. Our analysis yields the nding that standard
results of litigation contests change signicantly when emotions are taken into account. We
establish that emotions may increase or decrease individual equilibrium litigation eorts as
well as total eort in equilibrium. Thus it may be that the sum of litigation eorts actually
decreases in equilibrium, although the incorporation of emotions implies that more is at stake
for both parties. This will ensue if the importance of emotions diers for the trial parties,
such that the litigation contest, which is symmetric with respect to monetary payos and eort
costs, becomes an asymmetric contest, with asymmetries tending to lower equilibrium eorts
(see, e.g., Konrad 2009). With regard to individual equilibrium eort, an asymmetry in the
emotional intensity is also conducive to, but not necessary for, a decrease in the level of eort
relative to the benchmark case. This may also occur if the case is, in terms of evidence, tilted
towards the other party, while both parties are equally emotional. In that case, however,
1the reduction in equilibrium eort invested by one party relative to the benchmark is not
sucient to compensate for the increase in equilibrium eort by the other party, implying an
increase in total litigation eort. Seeking to distill dierences in behavior due to the presence
of emotions, we also consider the plainti's incentives to bring the suit. The analysis suggests
that emotions may reinforce or weaken a plainti's incentives to do so. While expected payos
for the plainti are always positive in the benchmark, this need not hold in the set-up which
allows for emotions, due to the negative emotions the plainti experiences if the case is lost. A
nal aspect of interest to us is the way in which the incentive eects of emotions interact with
a welfare measure labeled justice. We nd that in the majority of cases, the plainti's winning
probability is no longer closely aligned with the underlying facts of the case, resulting in a
deviation from the principle of justice. This result is a direct consequence of the repercussions
that emotions entail for the equilibrium contest eorts.
1.2 Relationship to existing literature
The present analysis is related to two distinct strands of existing literature. First, we link our
contribution to other papers that similarly use the contest framework to derive conclusions
about litigants' behavior. Second, we refer to papers in the literature on applied economic
theory which similarly supply analyses of preferences that are extended to incorporate emotions.
We adopt the notion that litigation can be conceptualized as a contest, as in Katz (1988),
Farmer and Pecorino (1999), W arneryd (2000), Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001), Parisi (2002),
Baik and Kim (2007a,b), and Friehe (forthcoming), among others. For instance, Farmer and
Pecorino (1999) compare the performance of the American and English fee shifting rules, while
Parisi (2002) compares the adversarial system of adjudication with the inquisitorial one. The
litigants' interests in these analyses always lie with the monetary judgment only. We contribute
to this body of work by allowing for additional considerations that are likely to have an impact
on perceived payos and therefore equilibrium outcomes.
Emotions play a central role in the contributions by Kr akel (2008a,b,c), Kragl and Schmid
(2009), and Grund and Sliwka (2005), among others. Many of these contributions discuss
questions revolving around incentive contracts. Kr akel (2008a) introduces emotions workers
experience when comparing their performance to that of co-workers, and establishes that these
2emotions might make uneven tournaments preferable to even ones. In Kr akel (2008b), the
interplay of emotions and incentives under the piece-rate system is investigated, while Kr akel
(2008c) analyzes emotions in the realm of rank-order tournaments and identies certain con-
ditions under which the principal benets from emotional agents. Kragl and Schmid (2009)
study how envy impacts relational employment contracts in a setting with two agents and moral
hazard and nd that inequity aversion may be benecial for the principal since relational con-
tracts may be more protable. Likewise, Grund and Sliwka (2005) analyze tournaments with
inequity-averse agents. In sum, preferences which include emotional aspects have been studied
theoretically with respect to their implications for organizational incentive systems. However,
an analysis of the incentive eects of emotions in the litigation contest is lacking and indeed
due, given the importance of emotional motives in that realm.
The balance of the article is as follows. The next section presents the benchmark litigation
contest without reference to emotions. Emotions are introduced in section 3, where we rst turn
to a reasonably general formalization and then provide a full analysis including comparative
statics aspects for a tractable specication. Section 4 concludes our study.
2 The benchmark: Litigation contest without emotions
Consider a complete-information setting in which risk-neutral defendant D and plainti P
simultaneously invest litigation eort equal to d and p, respectively, in order to increase their
respective probabilities of winning the lawsuit, given by (1   q) and q. The probability q is




Y p + (1   Y )d
(1)
for strictly positive eort levels.1 That is, with regard to the contest success function, we
consider what has become known as the Tullock contest.2 In particular, we use the litigation
success function developed by Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001), which allows for variations in
1We focus our attention on interior solutions only.
2This contest success function is the one most widely applied (see, e.g., Konrad 2009). For the rst application
in a rent-seeking setting, see Tullock (1980). Axiomatizations can be found in Skaperdas (1996), as well as
Kooreman and Schoonbeek (1997); for a discussion of the equivalence of Tullock contests and lotteries, see
Allard (1988).
3the level of defendant fault denoted Y . The way in which this function is formalized ensures
that, given equal degrees of fault, the trial outcome is contingent only on litigation eorts,
and that, given equal litigation eorts, the trial outcome is contingent only on the degree of
fault. Parties value winning according to the level of the judgment, J. The litigation contest
is - except for the level of fault - symmetric, with both players valuing winning the contest
similarly and facing the same costs of litigation eort.
The defendant's payos can be stated as

D
NE = (1   q)J   d (2)
sub-indexed by NE for no emotions. The defendant selects the level of litigation eort d such
as to maximize (2) given the level of plainti eort p. The level of d is thus set according to
the rst-order condition
pY (1   Y )J
(Y p + (1   Y )d)2 = 1 (3)
which leads to the following defendant's best response function:
BR
D
NE = dNE(p) =
p
pJ(1   Y )Y   pY
1   Y
(4)
The payos the plainti expects from the contest can be stated as:

P
NE = qJ   p (5)
The plainti chooses p such as to maximize (5) given the level of defendant eort d. The
privately optimal level of p is thus chosen in accordance with the rst-order condition
dY (1   Y )J
(Y p + (1   Y )d)2 = 1 (6)
and leads to the following statement of the best response function of the plainti:
BR
P
NE = pNE(d) =
p
dJ(1   Y )Y   d(1   Y )
Y
(7)
The equilibrium eorts are given by
p

NE =JY (1   Y ) (8)
d

NE =JY (1   Y ) (9)
4as already stated in Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001). From the fact that, in equilibrium, both
parties invest the same litigation eort into the contest, it follows that the plainti's winning
probability is equal to the level of defendant fault:
q

NE = Y (10)
In this way, the outcome of the trial is perfectly equitable in terms of justice. The description










The plainti is better o ling the suit because P
NE > 0, given that there are no xed costs
associated with ling. The defendant is better o defending the case instead of surrendering
because paying the judgment right away corresponds to payos equal to zero, whereas D
NE > 0.
3 Litigation contest with emotions
In this section, we introduce the concept of emotions into the litigation contest. We will rst
describe the way in which we incorporate emotions into the litigation contest in a general set-
up and derive ndings with respect to the equilibrium litigation eort levels. Subsequently, we
will use a functional specication of emotions for tractability and deliver a comparative statics
analysis of equilibrium eort, the plainti's incentives to bring a suit, and justice with respect
to the level of defendant fault and measures of emotional intensity.
3.1 The set-up
Emotions are by no means an easy concept (e.g., Elster 1998). However, in taking emotions
into account, we are dealing with aspects that are likely to play an important role in many
circumstances. Litigants' emotions, if they play a role, are almost certainly dependent on who
wins the lawsuit and on the characteristics of the case, which may be captured by the level of
defendant fault Y . There are also additional aspects which we might expect to have an inuence
on litigants' emotions, such as the identity of the opposing party, the history of the relationship
5between the conicting parties (e.g., in divorce trials) or the level of legal costs incurred by the
other party. In this exploratory analysis, we restrict ourselves to the two aspects of who wins
and the defendant fault level.
If the plainti wins (loses), she will experience positive (negative) emotions. These emotions
will impact on the subjective payo consequences. We argue that winning (losing) the case
at court implies a payo of E
+
i (J;Y ) (-E
 
i (J;Y )) for party i, i = P;D. These payos are
determined by the level of the judgment J, traditionally the sole component, and the emotions









@J  0, and
@E 
P
@Y > 0. The changes with respect to the level of defendant fault,




P , are relatively straightforward and can be explained as
follows. A high level of defendant fault implies that the plainti feels that she ought to win.
As a consequence, emotions do not add much to obtaining the judgment in the winning state
because the plainti's winning the case was very much expected. In contrast, the plainti may
experience very strong negative emotions if a case in which Y is high is indeed lost. Such
an outcome would be perceived as unfair and thus cause emotional upheaval. Regarding the













The payos of the defendant now explicitly take account of both possible states, winning
and losing, and can be stated as:

D




D   d (13)
sub-indexed by E for emotions. The privately optimal level of d is chosen according to the
rst-order condition
pY (1   Y )




D) = 1 (14)
which clearly shows the role emotions play with regard to individual incentives to invest litiga-




E = dE(p) =
p











D takes the place held by the judgment
J in the benchmark case. Consequently, it follows that there is more at stake for the defendant
6than in the benchmark and she will thus tend to be more aggressive in the contest, all else
equal. These observations similarly apply to the plainti. The plainti's payos in the more





P   (1   q)E
 
P   p (16)
The privately optimal level of p is set to fulll
dY (1   Y )




P ) = 1 (17)
A rearrangement leads to the plainti's best response function
BR
P
E = pE(d) =
p
















P , these levels amount to
p

E =Y (1   Y )
EDE2
P




E =Y (1   Y )
EPE2
D
[(1   Y )ED + Y EP]
2 (20)
which must be compared with (8) and (9), the eort levels in a litigation contest neglecting
emotions.
The statement of equilibrium levels in (19) and (20) allows us to make some initial observa-
tions. Although both parties contest for the same judgment sum and both have marginal eort
costs of one, the litigation contest may no longer be symmetric due to the incorporation of emo-
tions. This is shown in the respective objective functions and also in the levels of equilibrium
litigation eort. Except for the case in which ED = EP, equilibrium eort by the plainti will
be dierent from the defendant's equilibrium eort level. Any asymmetry in equilibrium eort
levels in turn implies that the plainti's winning probability in equilibrium is dierent from
the level of defendant fault, which is in stark contrast to the equilibrium plainti's winning
probability in the standard litigation contest described before.
Closer inspection of (8) and (9), as well as (19) and (20), yields the following result,
the proof of which is relegated to the appendix:
7Proposition 1 In comparison to the results for the standard litigation contest, the presence
of emotions can cause (i) the plainti to invest more in equilibrium and the defendant less,
the plainti to invest less in equilibrium and the defendant more, or both to invest more in
equilibrium, and (ii) total litigation eort to increase or decrease.
We nd that, quite intuitively, the plainti invests relatively more eort and the defendant
less if the plainti's emotions have relatively more impact on incentives. In graphical terms,
the stronger emotions cause the plainti's best response function to be shifted outwards to a
larger extent than that of the defendant. As a consequence, the equilibrium is located at a
point where the defendant's best response function slopes downward. In such a case, it may be
that the defendant will actually invest less eort in equilibrium, even though both best response
functions have been shifted outward in comparison to the benchmark case. In contrast, if the
change in location of the respective best response functions is fairly similar, both equilibrium
eort levels, and therefore total litigation eort, increase.
In the next section, we will describe ED and EP in more detail in order to provide a full
comparative statics analysis.
3.2 A functional specication of emotions
In our full-blown analysis, we specify emotional consequences for the litigants which (i) are
dependent on the level of defendant fault, (ii) may dier in intensity between the plainti
and the defendant, and (iii) may dier in intensity between the winning and the losing state.
For instance, in product liability or environmental liability trials, the plainti will often be
an individual, whereas the defendant is a corporation. It is then easy to imagine that the
plainti will be more pronouncedly aected by emotions. In the following, we normalize the
judgment level J to one, assume that payos can be separated into monetary and non-monetary
consequences and, more concretely, that
E
+












D =(2   k)(2   t)(1   Y )
2 (24)
8where k 2 [0;2] (t 2 [0;2]) is a scaling factor used to represent potential dierences in the
emotional intensity between the dierent states, winning and losing (the dierent litigants,
plainti and defendant).
The best response functions and equilibrium levels of litigants' contest eort can be obtained
using the terms (15), (18), (19), and (20). This paper seeks to analyze the way in which the
results of this set-up which takes account of emotions dier from the results of the benchmark
without emotions. As a consequence, we will subsequently detail the changes that occur relative
to that benchmark. Variables of interest are equilibrium eort levels, a plainti's incentives to
bring suit, and justice. We will highlight the parameter combinations for which the variable of
interest is higher or lower than in the benchmark, illustrating them in two-dimensional graphs.
Varying t and Y continuously, where t 2 (0;2) and Y 2 (0;1), we consider three dierent
levels of k, k 2 f:5;1;1:5g. It will be evident that the three dierent levels of k suce to obtain
an understanding of the changes that occur in this dimension. We will begin our discussion
with the dierence in equilibrium plainti litigation eort.
Figure 1 shows that the plainti will often exert higher equilibrium eort in the case where
emotions are taken into account. The graph is to be read as follows: The brown area indicates
the region where plainti eort is higher than in the benchmark case for all values of k con-
sidered; in the grayish area plainti eort is higher than in the benchmark case for k = 1 and
k = 1:5 but lower for k = 0:5; the yellow area contains all combinations for which plainti eort
is higher than in the benchmark scenario only for k = 1:5; nally, plainti eort is lower for
all considered values of k in the plain area.3 Given that the plainti perceives that more is at
stake, more eort can be expected, so that it is rather the observation of less eort that requires
explanation. The set of parameter combinations of Y and t where equilibrium plainti eort
is smaller than in the benchmark is largest if k = :5. As long as the level of defendant fault is
suciently small, equilibrium plainti eort is relatively smaller, even in the case of emotional
symmetry, in which t = 1 holds. The low level of k implies strong negative emotions in the
losing state. The losing state is relatively likely if the facts of the case favor the defendant, i.e.
if Y < :5. To provide more intuition, we look at the net benets from contest eort for a given
3The gures to come are to be read accordingly.









dt(1   Y )Y [k(1   2Y ) + 2Y 2]
(pY + d(1   Y ))2 (25)
for a given level of d. This shows that as long as Y < :5 holds, marginal eort benets are
higher for a higher level of k, i.e. a higher emotional impact of the winning state. The allocation
of emotional importance between the winning and the losing state is irrelevant only if Y = :5.
Should the case be tilted towards the plainti in evidence terms, i.e. should Y > :5 hold, then
higher levels of k actually reduce eort incentives in the emotions set-up, compared to in the
set-up without emotions. These aspects are a direct consequence of our functional specication,
E
+
P = 1 + kt(1   Y )2 and E
 
P = (2   k)tY 2, since EP = 1 + t[k(1   2Y ) + 2Y 2]. Furthermore,
the dierence establishes the intuitive fact that a higher level of t increases marginal eort
benets for the plainti. In contrast, the impact of an increase in the level of defendant fault
Y on the dierence in marginal net benets may be positive or negative. Apart from these
eects, the dierence in marginal eort incentives for a given level of d is confounded by dif-
ferent equilibrium levels of d in the \no emotions" and \emotions" set-up. As is clear from
(25), only equilibrium levels of defendant eort which dier between set-ups can explain the
fact that plaintis may choose lower contest eort if Y < :5. The gure below illustrates that
the plainti reduces eort to below the benchmark level if the defendant is very emotional, i.e.
t is small, and has a strong case, i.e. Y is small.
Figure 2 illustrates the changes in equilibrium litigation eort by the defendant in response
to variations in t, Y , and k. The underlying rationale for the dierence between equilibrium
eort in the set-up with emotions and the eort level in the set-up without emotions parallels









p(2   t)(1   Y )Y [2(1   Y )2   k(1   2Y )]
(pY + d(1   Y ))2 (26)
for a given level of p. As we would expect, the areas in which the emotions set-up provokes a
smaller level of defendant eort are opposite to the areas in which the emotions set-up provokes
a smaller level of plainti eort. If the plainti is very emotional, i.e. t is large, and has a
strong case, i.e. Y is large, the defendant reduces eort to below the benchmark level.








Figure 1: Relative plainti eort
In Figure 3, we are concerned with changes in the level of total litigation eort. We nd
that one litigant investing less is in some cases actually strong enough to dominate the increase
in the level of equilibrium eort by the other litigant. Exactly in line with the reasoning pre-
sented for individual equilibrium eort, the result of lower total litigation eort occurs for most
combinations of Y and t if the emotional weight is skewed to the losing state, that is, if k is
small. If both Y and t are small, the reduction in plainti eort is sucient to compensate for
the increase in defendant eort, and vice versa if both Y and t are large. The fact that the
incorporation of emotions may provoke lower total litigation eort comes as a surprise since
emotions ensure that more is at stake for litigation contest parties. However, this surprising
result has a very simple explanation. The decrease in the level of total litigation eort occurs
only if the value of t is not equal to one, i.e. only if there is an asymmetry in litigant emotions.
Such an asymmetry implies dierent valuations by contest parties and has been shown to re-
duce total eort (see, e.g., Konrad 2009).
The next criterion we turn to is the plainti's incentives to bring the suit. It may be argued
that the plainti will le the suit whenever this implies a non-negative total expected payo.








Figure 2: Relative defendant eort
This always holds in the benchmark since, for J = 1, the plainti's equilibrium payo is given
by Y 2. Interestingly, total expected payo is not always positive in the framework which con-
siders emotions, i.e. the plainti does not have incentives to bring the suit for all parameter
values. Indeed, it can clearly be seen in the case with k = :5 that the plainti prefers to abstain
from bringing trial for levels of defendant fault below one half and intermediate values of t,
where the latter implies that both parties indeed consider emotional consequences when choos-
ing their behavior. The set of parameters which bring about a non-positive expected plainti
payo is smaller, the higher the level of k. There are still combinations of Y and t for which the
plainti does not bring the suit if k = :9, but this is no longer so if k = 1 as shown in Figure 4.
This may be explained by the eects of k on the payos and on the equilibrium eort levels.
For small levels of k, the plainti invests relatively little in the contest as long as Y and t are of
only moderate magnitude. The defendant invests relatively more for these cases. Furthermore,
a small level of k implies that the emotional costs in the losing state are considerable. As a
consequence, the plainti may prefer to abstain from ling suit.
In Figure 5, we follow up on the question concerning in which way emotions aect the








Figure 3: Relative total eort
plainti's incentives to bring the suit by illustrating whether the level of the plainti's equi-
librium payo in expectation terms is higher in the setting with emotions than in the setting
without emotions. Regardless of the level of k, the two-dimensional space is divided into a
region in which expected payos are relatively higher and a region in which these are relatively
lower. Plainti payos turn out to be higher in the setting in which emotions are taken into
consideration than in the benchmark, particularly when the plainti is relatively emotional and
the evidence bias favors the defendant. An increase in the level of k causes the region in which
expected payos are relatively higher to expand. Indeed, the region where plainti payos are
higher when k = :5 is relatively small, which is in accordance with the level of plainti payos
illustrated in Figure 4.
This paper contrasts the outcomes of the standard litigation contest with the results ob-
tained for a set-up that incorporates a notion of emotions. From a welfare perspective, two
issues are of utmost importance. (i) Total litigation eort represents a use of resources which
is of no direct social value in our framework and has been dealt with above. (ii) Achieving
justice, which may be interpreted as aligning defendant fault and the plainti's win rate (Hir-








Figure 4: Positive plainti payos
shleifer and Osborne 2001), is another crucial welfare consideration. In our case, the \objective"
plainti win rate is equal to Y since it corresponds with the level of defendant fault. In the
benchmark, the plainti's winning probability in equilibrium is indeed equal to Y . We may now
seek to compare the plainti's winning probability which results in the emotions setting with
the \objective" plainti win rate. Figure 6 establishes that the plainti's winning probability
in equilibrium is equal to Y only in few contingencies. The colored areas represent com-
binations of t and Y for which q
E > Y holds, i.e., for which the plainti's winning
probability in equilibrium exceeds the objective level of defendant fault. The gure
is to be read as the ones before with the purple (red) area indicating parameter constellations
for which q
E > Y for k = 0:5 and k = 1 but not for k = 1:5 (for k = 0:5 but not for k = 1
and k = 1:5). If emotions in the winning and the losing state are of the same importance, i.e.
if k = 1, then q
NE = Y is greater (smaller) than q
E when t < (>)1. In other terms, if the
emotional balance is tilted towards the plainti, this implies quite intuitively that the plainti
will win more often than justied by the facts in equilibrium and vice versa. This picture
changes somewhat if k 6= 1. If there is more weight on the losing state, such that k = :5, the
plainti's winning probability may be relatively higher if 0 < Y < :5, but only if t is of sucient








Figure 5: Relative plainti payos
magnitude. This naturally relates back to the fact that the plainti (defendant) equilibrium
eort in the emotional set-up is lower (higher) than in the benchmark for a large set of Y and
t if Y and t are small. The contour we obtain for k = :5 is mirrored for the case where k = 1:5.
4 Conclusion
Emotions are an important aspect of human existence. Emotions may eectively act as a
reward or sanction in specic circumstances. For instance, winning a contest although the
chances were bleak at best can be very satisfactory for the contestant. Such aspects will be
anticipated by individuals and therefore steer behavior. This paper introduces the notion of
emotions into the litigation contest. Litigation often forms a way of dealing with fundamental
disagreements between parties and is therefore prone to evoke emotions.
We nd that emotions change the results of the standard litigation contest in several inter-
esting ways. For instance, despite the fact that both parties have more at stake if emotional
consequences are considered in addition to direct monetary consequences of a trial outcome,
total equilibrium litigation eort may decrease. Furthermore, emotions may deter or encourage








Figure 6: Relative plainti's win rate
the bringing of the suit by the plainti in the rst place. From a welfare perspective, the
presence of emotions tends to mean that the case is in many cases not decided according to the
underlying facts, but more (or less) often than it should be in favor of the plainti.
The analysis has therefore convincingly established that taking account of emotions in liti-
gation may profoundly change the predictions concerning litigants' behavior and trial outcomes.
If the litigation contest framework is used to derive policy implications, for instance, regarding
the choice between dierent rules of legal cost allocation, we believe that the robustness of
policy recommendations with respect to the incorporation of emotions ought to be tested.
This study presents an initial exploration of the potential repercussions of emotions for
incentives in litigation. Undoubtedly, there are limitations to our analysis: we assume, for
instance, in line with the bulk of the literature that both parties invest simultaneously and
that they invest only once. Furthermore, we disregard aspects such as strategic delegation to
agents who are particularly emotional or not at all. The incorporation of such aspects presents
a worthwhile challenge for future research.
16Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) The plainti and defendant invest relatively more (less) eort if
EDE2
P
[(1   Y )ED + Y EP]
2 > (<)J (27)
EPE2
D
[(1   Y )ED + Y EP]
2 > (<)J (28)
Both requirements may be reformulated as:
P =EDE
2
P   J [(1   Y )ED + Y EP]
2 > (<)0 (29)
D =EPE
2
D   J [(1   Y )ED + Y EP]
2 > (<)0 (30)




















D   JEP) (34)
This clearly establishes that defendant (plainti) eort will be greater than in the benchmark
as long as EP (ED) > J if Y ! 0 (1). In contrast, plainti (defendant) eort may be smaller
or greater than in the benchmark as long as EP (ED) > J if Y ! 0 (1). Both litigants invest
more, for instance, if ED = EP and ED > J since P > 0 and D > 0.
(ii) Total litigation eort increases (decreases) if
P+D = EDEP(EP + ED)   2J [(1   Y )ED + Y EP]
2 > (<)0 (35)
One way to see that circumstances can easily be determined in which both of the cases laid out
in the proposition indeed arise is again to consider the extreme values of Y :
lim
Y !0
P+D =ED [EP(EP + ED)   2JED] (36)
lim
Y !1
P+D =EP [ED(EP + ED)   2JEP] (37)
and attest that these may be greater or smaller than zero.
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